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Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence
*
 
We study risk-taking behavior in a simple two person tournament in a theoretical model as 
well as a laboratory experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents 
simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow for all possible 
degrees of correlation between the outcomes of the risky strategies. We show that risk-taking 
behavior crucially depends on this correlation as well as on the size of a potential lead of one 
of the contestants. We find that the experimental subjects acted mostly quite well in line with 
the derived theoretical predictions. 
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In tournaments, contestants compete against each other for a limited set of
given prizes. Typically, one contestant with the best performance receives
the winner prize and the less successful competitors only receive lower loser
prizes. Tournament situations have been analyzed analytically within many
diﬀerent frameworks since the seminal article of Lazear and Rosen (1981)
(for early contributions compare also Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) or Green
and Stokey (1983)).
However, most contributions have focussed on optimal eﬀort choices, i.e.
contestants can choose among diﬀerent outcome distributions with the same
variance but diﬀerent means where higher means are associated with higher
eﬀort costs. Yet, in real world tournaments contestants often also make
decisions determining the variance of outcomes. For example mutual fund
managers have to decide between risky or safe portfolios, or ﬁr m sh a v et o
choose between implementing a new technology or staying with the standard
one. In politics a “gambling for resurrection“ phenomenon has often been
observed. That is, political leaders who fear defeat in an election sometimes
seem to choose risky policy alternatives in order to turn around their fate.
A key intuition often expressed is that a front runner should aim at safe
policy options whereas a contestant trailing in the competition has incentives
to choose a riskier strategy. However, this intuition disregards the possibility
that often the sets of policy options from which the contestants can choose are
very similar, making it harder for the trailing candidate to diﬀerentiate from
the front runner. That is, a front runner may try to imitate a risky policy
chosen by the competitor exactly in order to protect his lead: independent
of whether the policy fails or succeeds with the voters the relative position
remains unchanged when the policy can be exactly replicated.
In this paper we study risk taking in a formal tournament model as well
as a laboratory experiment. We analyze a simple tournament in which two
contestants can choose among a safe or a risky policy option. We investigate
2under which circumstances a trailing agent indeed gambles and a front run-
ner goes for the safe option. Our main theoretical and empirical observation
is that the result strongly depends on the correlation between the outcomes
of the risky strategies measuring the similarity of the set of policy options
available to the contestants. When the correlation is low, the standard intu-
ition indeed holds but when the correlation is higher this is no longer clear
as the front runner may have an incentive to imitate a risky strategy choice
of his opponent.
Bronars (1986) was the ﬁrst to discuss risk taking as a choice variable in a
tournament context arguing that leading agents in sequential tournaments
prefer a low risk strategy and whereas their opponents prefer a high risk.
Hvide (2002) or Kräkel and Sliwka (2004) show that when the contestants
ﬁr s tm a k ear i s ka n dt h e na ne ﬀort choice, a risky strategy may be attractive
even for a trailing agent as it serves as a commitment device for exerting
lower eﬀorts at the later stage. But in both models the outcomes of the risky
strategies are uncorrelated. Gaba and Kalra (1999), Hvide and Kristiansen
(2003) or Taylor (2003) concentrate on the choice of risk in tournaments
without endogenous eﬀorts. Most closely related to our paper is the model
by Taylor (2003), analyzing the behavior of mutual fund managers who can
invest in portfolios that contain safe and risky assets. In his model the out-
comes of the risky strategies are perfectly correlated such that both managers
receive exactly the same return when they invest in the risky asset. In this
game only a mixed equilibrium exists in which the leading agent chooses the
riskier strategy more often than the trailing agent. In a sense, our model
nests Taylor’s model with the more standard tournament models where the
outcomes are uncorrelated.
There are now numerous examples of empirical studies on tournaments and
some of them analyze risk taking. Becker and Huselid (1992) investigate
individual behavior in stock car racing and show that drivers take more
risk if prizes and prize spreads are large. Brown et al. (1996) or Chevalier
3and Ellison (1997) analyze the behavior of mutual fund managers. They
ﬁnd that expected losers prefer high risks while expected winners prefer low
risks. Tournaments have been investigated in laboratory experiments as well
but all of the existing contributions focus on eﬀort rather than risk taking
decisions (see for instance Bull et al. (1987), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003),
Orrison et al. (2004), Eriksson et al. (2006), Sutter and Strassmair (2007) or
Carpenter et al. (2007)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce
the model and analyze the possible Nash equilibria. Section 3 describes the
experimental design and procedures. The hypotheses are shown in section 4
and in section 5 we present the experimental results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The Model
We consider a simple tournament between two agents A and B.W e f o c u s
on the risk taking decisions of the contestants and assume that both agents
simultaneously decide among a risky and a safe strategy, i.e. di ∈ {r,s} for
i = A,B. Each agent’s decision aﬀects the distribution of his performance yi
as:
yi = µs when di = s
yi =˜ yi ∼ N (µr,σ 2) when di = r
We allow for the possibility that one of the agents initially has a lead which
m a yf o ri n s t a n c eb ed u et od i ﬀerences in ability or the outcome of some prior
stage in the competition. Without loss of generality we assume that agent
A has a lead and wins the tournament when the sum of his performance yA
and the lead ∆yA exceeds his rival’s performance yB where ∆yA ≥ 0.W h e n
yA + ∆yA = yB each agent wins the tournament with probability 1
2.
Note that the variance of the risky option is the same for both agents. The
4performance outcomes ˜ yi are correlated with correlation coeﬃcient ρ. Hence,
we allow for the possibility that ρ =0as in Hvide (2002) and Kräkel and
Sliwka (2004) or that ρ =1as in Taylor (2003) but also consider intermediate
cases. The winner of the tournament receives a prize giving him a utility
normalized to 1 and the loser’s utility is zero. It is important to note that risk
attitudes do not matter at all for the equilibrium outcomes as any rescaling
of these two utility values does not alter the best responses.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
When both agents choose the safe option dA = dB = s of course A always
wins the tournament when ∆yA is strictly positive. When ∆yA =0each
agent wins with probability 1
2.W h e nA plays safe agent B’s only chance of




A =P r( ∆yA + µs > ˜ yB)=Φ
µ
∆yA + µs − µr
σ
¶
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
distribution. When both agents choose the risky strategy player A wins with
probability Prr
A =P r( ˜ yB − ˜ yA ≤ ∆yA).N o t et h a t˜ yB − ˜ yA follows a normal















1 when ρ =1 .
Finally, when A plays risky and B plays safe, A’s winning probability is
P
rs
A =P r( ∆yA +˜ yA >µ s)=1− Φ
µ




For ease of notation let ∆µ = µr − µs which is positive if the risky strategy
5has a higher expected outcome than the safe one and negative in the opposite
c a s e .I ti si n s t r u c t i v et os t a r tw i t ht h ec a s et h a t∆yA =0 .I nt h a tc a s et h e




























When ∆µ =0both players are indiﬀerent between both strategies. But
there is a unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies in which both
agents choose the risky strategy when the risky strategy has a higher return,
i.e. ∆µ>0. Whatever the opponent’s strategy, a player can always raise
the probability of winning by deviating to the risky strategy. If ∆µ<0 the
unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is (safe,safe).
Much more interesting is the case where one player has a lead, i.e. where
w.l.o.g. ∆yA > 0. The agents then play the following zero sum game where

































First, it is straightforward to see that (risky,safe) and (safe,safe) can
never be Nash equilibria. In the ﬁrst case, the leading player A wins for
6sure when deviating to the safe strategy. In the second, player B will always
d e v i a t et ot h er i s k ys t r a t e g ya sh eo t h e r w i s el o s e sf o rs u r e .
When agent B plays risky the leading player A can indeed lose the tourna-
ment with a positive probability. It is interesting to investigate under what
























As playing risky leaves player B the only chance to win the tournament, we
can directly conclude:
Proposition 1 A pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in which the leading









Hence, higher values of the lead ∆yA and smaller values of ∆µ tend to make it
more likely that the leading player sticks to the safe strategy. To understand
the result it is instructive ﬁrst to consider the case where the performance
outcomes of the risky strategies are uncorrelated (i.e. ρ =0 ). In this case,
condition (1) is equivalent to
∆µ
∆yA ≤ 1 − 1
2
√
2. When the risky strategy does
not lead to a higher expected performance such that ∆µ ≤ 0 the leading agent
A will then always stick to the safe strategy as playing the risky strategy will
only raise the probability to forgo the leading position. The larger ∆µ the
more attractive it of course becomes to switch to the risky strategy. This will
be the more so, the smaller the initial lead ∆yA as protecting a small lead is
not worthwhile when the risky strategy becomes more attractive in terms of
expected performance. But it is interesting that this picture changes when
the outcomes of the risky strategies are correlated. Note that condition (1)
is always violated if ρ tends to one.
7The larger the correlation between the risky strategies the more attractive
it becomes for player A to choose the risky strategy when B h a sd o n et h e
s a m e—e v e nw h e nh i sl e a d∆yA is large and even when the risky strategy
does not lead to a much higher expected performance. The reason is that
with correlated performance outcomes, choosing the risky strategy becomes
a means to protect the lead. Hence, we now have to check under which
conditions a Nash equilibrium exists in which both agents play the risky
strategy.
As analyzed above, when B plays risky the leading player A will prefer to




































H e n c ew ec a nc o n c l u d e :
Proposition 2 A pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in which both play-
















Note that condition (4) is always violated if ∆µ<0. If the risky strategy
does not lead to a higher expected outcome than the safe one the players will
never play (risky,risky).
For ∆µ>0 consider ﬁrst again the case where the outcomes of the risky
8strategies are uncorrelated (i.e. ρ =0 ). Condition (4) is now equivalent to
∆µ
∆yA ≥ 1 − 1
2
√
2. Note that this is the opposite of condition (1) given in
Proposition 1. The reason is that player B always prefers the risky strategy
when ρ =0irrespective of A’s decision. As already laid out, when A plays
safe playing the risky strategy is the only way for player B to have at least
a chance of winning. When, however, A plays risky, player B has such a
chance already when playing safe, but can increase the odds by playing risky.
Hence, for ρ =0only player A’s considerations determine which equilibrium
is played. Both play risky in this case if and only if
∆µ
∆yA is suﬃciently large
as only then it will be reasonable for player A to take the risk and not to
protect the lead.
As pointed out above, the reasoning is diﬀerent if the outcomes of the risky
strategies are correlated. As we have already seen, agent A has an incentive
to imitate a risky strategy of his opponent if the correlation gets larger. To







-space. Condition (2) determines the downward sloping curve
that separates the region in which agent A p l a y ss a f ea n da g e n tB plays risky
from that where both play risky. The higher ρ the more attractive it becomes
for agent A to switch to the risky strategy as well. A special case is ρ = 1
2.
In this case condition (4) simpliﬁes to
∆µ
∆yA ≥ 0 and, hence, the agents will
always play (risky,risky) whenever ∆µ ≥ 0 no matter how large the initial
lead is.
But when the correlation gets larger, choosing the risky strategy becomes
less attractive for player B. The stronger the correlation the smaller is the
probability for player B to overtake player A when both play risky. In the
extreme, when ρ =1 , both agents will always attain the same outcome when
playing the risky strategy and, hence, agent A would win for sure in this case.
In that case, however, player B has an incentive to deviate to the safe strategy
when player A plays risky. Playing safe leaves at least the possibility that
A is unlucky and falls behind. But of course, when player A in turn knows















































































Figure 1: Nash equilibria of the game
that B chooses the safe strategy, he would again want to deviate and choose
the safe strategy as well. Hence, we cannot have equilibria in pure strategies
if ρ =1a sh a sa l r e a d yb e e ns h o w nb yT a y l o r( 2 0 0 3 ) .B u tn o t et h a tw ec a n
already conclude from Propositions 1 and 2 that a similar reasoning must
hold for a larger set of parameters. As we already have checked the existence
conditions for all potential pure strategy equilibria, when conditions (1) and
(4) are both violated only mixed strategy equilibria can exist. Hence, we can
show the following result:













In any mixed strategy equilibrium, player A chooses the risky strategy with a
larger probability than player B if the risky strategy leads to a higher expected
outcome than the safe one. If ∆µ<0 player B chooses the risky strategy
10with a higher probability than his opponent.
Proof: See appendix.
Hence, only mixed strategy equilibria exist in the area between the both
curves in ﬁgure 1 if ρ>1
2. The larger the correlation between the outcomes
of the risky strategies and the smaller
∆µ
∆yA t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tam i x e d
strategy is played. In such an equilibrium, the leading player always chooses
the risky strategy with a higher probability than his opponent if ∆µ>0.
In this case, the higher expected payoﬀ of the risky strategy makes it more
attractive to gamble and the leading player can aﬀo r dt og a m b l ew i t hah i g h e r
probability due to his lead. If the outcome of the safe strategy is equal to
the expected outcome of the risky strategy both players will choose the risky
strategy with equal probability. The trailing player chooses the risky strategy
with a higher probability than the leading one if ∆µ<0. Here, the trailing
player has a stronger incentive to play risky although this entails a loss in
expected payoﬀs.
3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We implemented the simple risk taking tournament in a laboratory experi-
m e n t .W er a nt h r e ed i ﬀerent treatments for each of which we conducted one
session with 24 participants. In each of 23 p e r i o d st w op l a y e r sw e r em a t c h e d
together randomly and anonymously. Hence, each participant played 23
times and each time with a diﬀerent opponent. This perfect stranger match-
ing was implemented to prevent reputation eﬀects. We varied the correlation
coeﬃcient of the risky strategy between the treatments. The ﬁrst treatment
had a correlation coeﬃcient of zero, the second of one and the third of 1
2.
Furthermore, we varied the lead ∆yA between the periods such that we are
able to investigate the eﬀects of ∆yA on player’s strategy choices.
11The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory of Economic Re-
search at the University of Cologne in January 2007.A l t o g e t h e r72 students
participated in the experiment. All of them were enrolled in the Faculty of
Management, Economics, and Social Sciences and had completed their sec-
ond year of studies. For the recruitment of the participants we used the online
recruitment system by Greiner (2003). We used the experimental software
z-tree by Fischbacher (2007) for programming the experiment.
At the outset of a session the subjects were randomly assigned to a cubical
where they took a seat in front of a computer terminal. The instructions
were handed out and read out by the experimenters.1 After that the subjects
h a dt i m et oa s kq u e s t i o n si ft h e yh a da n yd i ﬃculties in understanding the
instructions. Communication - other than with the experimental software -
was not allowed.
Each session started with 5 trial periods so that the players could get used to
the game. In the trial rounds each player had the opportunity to simulate the
game by choosing the strategies for both players and observing the outcomes.
After that the 23 main periods started. All periods were identical but played
with a diﬀerent partner. In the beginning of each period the players were
informed about their score of points which they had in the beginning and
the score of their opponent. So they knew whether they were the player
in lead and how large the diﬀerence between the scores was. The initial
scores of points were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 150
points and a standard deviation of 42 points. Then the players had to decide
whether they wanted to play a safe or a risky strategy. If a player chose the
safe strategy he received 80 additional points for sure. When choosing the
risky strategy the additional points awarded where determined by a random
draw from a normal distribution with a mean of 100 points and a standard
deviation of 20 points. In the ﬁrst treatment the risky strategies of both
1The full set of all our experimental instructions can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
12players were uncorrelated. In the second treatment the risky strategies were
perfectly correlated and in the third they were correlated with ρ = 1
2.T h i s
information was common knowledge. The key concepts where explained in
the instructions and the players had the opportunity to develop a “feel” for
the distribution in the trial rounds. After each player made his decision they
were informed about the additional points received and the ﬁnal score of
the game. The ﬁnal score was the sum of the initial points of each player
and his additional points won in the game. They were also informed which
player was the winner of the period. They played 23 periods with diﬀerent
partners. In the end of the experiment one of the 23 periods was drawn by
lot. Each player who won the tournament in which he participated in the
drawn period earned 25 Euro each loser earned only 5 Euro. Additionally, all
subjects received a show up fee of 2.50 Euro independent of their status as
winner or loser. After the last period the subjects were requested to complete
a questionnaire including questions on gender and age. The whole procedure
took about one hour.
4H y p o t h e s e s
First of all, based on the theoretical reasoning above, we expect that in the
treatment without correlation the leader plays the safe strategy more often
than the trailing player (Hypothesis 1). But of course, the model makes a
more precise prediction. Recall that the trailing player should always choose
the risky strategy. The leader should play the safe strategy if and only if the
lead is suﬃciently large and the expected gains from playing risky are low.
In our experiment the expected gains from playing risky were ﬁxed for all
treatments (∆µ =2 0 ) . In other words the player in lead should choose the




2 =6 8 .28 and otherwise should prefer the risky
strategy.
In the second treatment the performance outcomes of the risky strategies are
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Figure 2: Equilibrium mixed strategies if ρ =1
perfectly correlated and therefore only an equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists in the theoretical model. But the most important and testable impli-
cation is that — in contrast to the zero correlation case — we expect that the
player in lead will play risky more often than his opponent (Hypothesis 2).
Although we cannot expect that participants in the experiment are able to
coordinate on the mixed strategies equilibrium perfectly, the data should at
least be in line with some qualitative features of the equilibrium. Therefore it
is useful to consider the probabilities with which the players choose the risky
strategy derived in the proof of proposition 3. Figure 2 shows these proba-
bilities as a function of ∆yA for the parameter values used in the experiment.
Note that the leading player should choose the risky strategy in more than
80% and the trailing player in less than 20% of the cases. Furthermore we
expect that the probability that the trailing player plays the risky strategy
should decrease in ∆yA and the probability that the leader does the same
should increase in his lead.
For the third treatment we predict that both players will always choose the
























correlation 0 correlation 1 correlation 1/2
no lead lead
Figure 3: Overview
they both learn during the course of the experiment that the risky strategy
is beneﬁcial.
5 Results
We now test these hypotheses with the data from our experiment. Figure
3s h o w st h ef r a c t i o no fr o u n d si nw h i c ht h ep l a y e r si ne a c ht r e a t m e n tc h o s e
the risky strategy depending on whether the player had a lead.2
We start by investigating the results from treatment 1 where the outcomes
of the risky strategies were uncorrelated. Looking at ﬁgure 3 we see already
that the trailing player almost always chose the risky strategy when the
risky strategies were uncorrelated but that the leading player chose the safe
strategy in nearly 50% of the cases. Hence, these observations are well in line
2Table A1 in the Appendix gives the precise values.
15with hypotheses 1. To analyze whether the lead had an eﬀect on the choice
of strategy for the leader we ran a binary probit regression. The dependent
variable is the probability that the leading agent chooses the risky strategy.
The observations are not independent from each other as one subject plays
the game 23 times. Therefore we report robust standard errors clustered by
subject.3 The results are reported in table 1.4
(1) (2)
Leading player Leading player
Lead −0.0284∗∗∗
(0.0043)







Pseudo Log Likelihood −136.62092 -163.80531
Pseudo R2 0.2858 0.1436
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table 1: Probit regression for leading players in treatment 1
The period is included to check for time trends capturing possible learning
eﬀects. We see from column (1) that in line with the theoretical prediction, a
larger lead makes it indeed more likely for the leader to choose the safe strat-
3As an alternative we ran random eﬀects regressions. The results remain qualitatively
unchanged and are reported in the Appendix.



































































































































































































Figure 4: Choice of the risky strategy for diﬀerent leads in treatment 1
egy. This eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. Regression (2) uses a dummy variable
which takes value one if the lead is larger than 68.28 and zero otherwise. The
results are qualitatively similar to those of regression (1).N o t et h a tt h e r ea r e
no signiﬁcant time trends. Of course, the participants did not switch to the
safe strategy precisely at the predicted cut-oﬀ value, but still they learned
surprisingly well that playing safe is preferable when the lead gets larger as
is also illustrated in ﬁgure 4. It shows the frequencies of the risky strategy
choice for diﬀerent leads in treatment 1 (interval size 5).
We can summarize these observations as follows.
Result 1 (ρ =0 ): When the outcomes of the risky strategies are uncorrelated
the leading players choose the safe strategy more often than their opponents.
The trailing players nearly always choose the risky strategy (98.9%). The size
17of the lead has a strong inﬂuence on the probability that the leader chooses the
s a f es t r a t e g y :T h el a r g e rt h el e a d ,t h em o r eo f t e nt h es a f es t r a t e g yi sc h o s e n .
We now turn to the perfect correlation case in treatment 2.Al o o ka tﬁgure
3 already indicates that the leading player picked the risky option more often
than his opponent which is in stark contrast to the results from treatment 1
but well in line with the theoretical prediction.
(1) (2)








Pseudo Log Likelihood −63.417594 −173.62979
Pseudo R2 0.1161 0.0623
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table 2: Probit regression for treatment 2
Furthermore, as the theory predicts the leading players chose the risky strat-
egy in more than 80% (92.8%) of the cases. But the trailing players also
chose the risky option in 60.5% of the cases and not as we predicted in less
than 20% of the cases. This behavior may be due to the false intuition that
they had nothing to lose and therefore they preferred to gamble. The trailing
players seemed to disregard at least partially that the leader may also want
to play the risky strategy in which case the best reply is to play safe as only
18this leaves a chance to win the tournament. Again, we ran probit regressions
to test the predictions of the model. We ﬁrst consider the leading players’
behavior in model (1) and then that of the trailing players in model (2) of
table 2. First note, that we have to reject our prediction concerning the eﬀect
of the lead in both cases. The theoretical model predicted that the leader
plays the risky strategy more often the larger the lead and the trailing player
plays risky less often for larger initial diﬀerences. The empirical analysis
shows the opposite signs for both eﬀects. It seems that initially the players
followed the much more straightforward intuition from the case where the
outcomes were uncorrelated, i.e. that the leader should protect his lead by
playing safe and the trailing player can only ‘attack’ the leader by choosing
the risky strategy. But note that we observe strong learning eﬀects that seem
to direct the players closer to the equilibrium prediction. Over the course of
the experiment the leading players signiﬁcantly increased the probability of
playing the risky strategy and the trailing players reduced this probability.
We can summarize:
Result 2 (ρ =1 ): When the outcomes of the risky strategies are perfectly
correlated the leading players choose the risky strategy more often than their
opponents. The leaders choose the risky strategy in 92.8% and the trailing
players in 60.5% of the cases. Over the course the leading players increased
the probability of playing the risky strategy, whereas the trailing players re-
duced this probability.
Finally, we consider the results from the third treatment in which the cor-
relation coeﬃcient between the outcomes of the risky strategies was ρ = 1
2.
According to our theoretical predictions both players should always play the
risky strategy regardless how large the lead is. As we see in ﬁgure 3 this pre-
diction is true only for the trailing players. Leading agents chose the risky
option only in 68.1% of the cases. To analyze learning eﬀects and the eﬀect
of the lead on the choice of the strategy we use again a probit regression with
19the choice of strategy as dependent variable. The results of the regression are
reported in table 3. The regression shows that the lead indeed had an eﬀect
on the choice of the strategy. The probability that the leader played the safe
option rises when the lead got larger. This eﬀect might occur because the
leader thought that playing safe was an appropriate way to protect his lead-
ing position. During the experiment the leader learned that this assumption









Pseudo Log Likelihood −153.97572
Pseudo R2 0.1088
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects,
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table 3: Probit regression for leading players in treatment 3
When we take a look at the decisions the leading players made in the last
5 periods, we see that 76,7% of them preferred the risky strategy. We can
conclude:
Result 3 (ρ = 1
2): When the outcomes of the risky strategies are correlated
with ρ = 1
2 the trailing players play the risky strategy nearly in all cases
(94.6%). The leading players choose the risky strategy in only 68.1% of the
cases but increase this probability over the course of the experiment.
20Hence, it seems to be the case that learning directed the players towards the
equilibrium prediction.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have investigated a simple tournament model in which two agents simul-
taneously choose between a risky and a safe strategy. We have shown that
the equilibrium outcome strongly depends on the correlation between the
outcomes of the risky strategy. We then tested the predictions made based
on the model in a laboratory experiment. The key predictions have been
conﬁrmed: The leading players choose the safe strategy more often than the
trailing players if the outcomes are uncorrelated, but the contrary is true if
the outcomes are perfectly correlated.
From a more general standpoint, our model as well as the empirical results
have cast some light on the attractiveness of gambling in competitive situ-
ations. One interpretation of the correlation between the risky strategies is
the similarity in the set of available policy options. When the competitors
have access to similar policies, the correlation between the outcomes of the
risky strategies will be high. In this case, a trailing contestant can no longer
be certain that his opponent will stick to the safe strategy when choosing to
gamble. It even has turned out that the leading player will have a stronger
incentive to gamble than his trailing opponent when the risky strategy has
higher rewards in expected terms.
There are many open questions for future research. For instance, we so far
did not consider endogenous eﬀort choices and focused only on risk-taking
behavior. Moreover, it would be interesting to study risk taking behavior in
dynamic tournaments where the agents can react to past choices of their op-
ponents, for instance, to cast more light on the timing of risk-taking decisions
in competitive environments.
217 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Both players will randomize only if they are indiﬀerent between the payoﬀs
of both strategies. Suppose that player A chooses the risky strategy with











































































































































































which is true if ∆µ>0. In the special case ∆µ =0both players choose the
risky strategy with equal probability. If ∆µ<0 Player B will choose the
risky strategy with a higher probability than player A.
23Correlation 0 Correlation 1 Correlation 1
2
no lead lead no lead lead no lead lead
safe 0.011 0.507 0.395 0.072 0.054 0.319
risky 0.989 0.493 0.605 0.928 0.946 0.681
Table A1: Distribution of strategy choices for all treatments
(1) (2)
Leading player Leading player
Lead −0.0453∗∗∗
(0.0057)







Log Likelihood −110.38209 −147.50784
random eﬀects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table A2: Probit regressions with random eﬀects for leading players in treat-
ment 1
24(1) (2)








Log Likelihood −56.693898 −151.3198
random eﬀects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1










random eﬀects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table A4: Probit regression with random eﬀects for leading players in treat-
ment 3
25(1) (2)
Leading player Leading player
Lead −0.0113∗∗∗
(0.0016)





Pseudo Log Likelihood −136.62092 −163.80531
Pseudo R2 0.2858 0.1436
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects,
Marginal eﬀects reported, ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table A5: Probit regressions for leading players in treatment 1
(1) (2)






Pseudo Log Likelihood −63.417594 −173.62979
Pseudo R2 0.1161 0.0623
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects,
Marginal eﬀects reported, ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1







Pseudo Log Likelihood −153.97572
Pseudo R2 0.1088
Robust standard errors in parentheses are calculated by clustering on subjects,
Marginal eﬀects reported, ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table A7: Probit regression for leading players in treatment 3
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